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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GAYDON ELLIOTT WINGER,
Plaintiff,
-YS.-

I~SURANC:B~

COl\IPAKY OF

~ORTH A1\H~RICA,

-vs.-

Def end ant, Third Party
Plaintiff anrl Appellant,

Case No.
11323

L.A. BOWEN, clha L.A. BOWEN
INSURANCE, INC.
Thfrrl Porty Defe11da11t
and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT
STATFDIF~NT

OF CASE

Plaintiff initiated a declaratory judgment action
against defendant seeking a determination that defenda11t, Insurance Company of North America, provided
profossional liability insurance to plaintiff on August 9,
l 966, at approximately 6 :00 o'clock P.M, pursuant to a
1n·ofo8sional liability insurance policy originally issued
to him in 1060, which was renewed continuously each year
!hereafter and attempted to he renewed at the time the
a(·eidt•nt occurred.
1

Defendant filed a Third Pary Complaint against
L. A. Bowen, Third Party Def en<lant, seeking judgment
against him decreeing that Third Party Defendant is
liable to reimburse and pay Third Party Plaintiff all
costs and expenses of every kind and nature which it
incurred in investigating and defending the action and
for any amount paid pursuant to a judgment or settlement or compromise.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO-WER f'.OLTRT
The case Wfl.s tried to the Honorable .Joseph JI:.
Nelson sitting ·without a jury, and he awarded plaintiff
judgment in its favor and against d<:>fendant declaring
that the professional liability insurance policy issuer1
by defendant to plaintiff was in force and effect at timr
and date of the loss. The court also granted Third Party
Defendant judgment in its favor and against Third Party
Plaintiff no cause of action on the Third Party Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGH'l1
Respondent seeks to have the action of the lower
court affirmed in c11tering judgment of no cause of
action upon the Third Party Complaint and in denying
appellants Motion for New Trial.

STATE1'11EN'l' OF FACTS
In discussing the fads of this case, Dr. Gaydon E.
\Vinger \Vill be referred to as ·winger; Insurance Company of North America will he referred to as IN A arnl
L. A. Bowen will he r0f 0rred to as Bowen.

2

.

Bowen has operated nn insnran<'e agen<'v in Orem
'
Utah, under various names, all of which included his own
name from 1962 to the present time. (TR 113-115 ). Prior
to his acquisition of the hnsiness h0 now operates, it was
ow11ecl hy others and was call0<1 tl1e Cordner Agency.
(TR rn9) From 1962 continuously until December 16,
1965, Bowen was a licensed agent for INA and as such
had authority to submit applications for insurance, bind
coverage, collect premiums, countersign policies and the
usual authority conferred upon an agent by au insurance
rompany. (TR 115, 116)
Sometime i11 1960, Winger obtained a professional
liability insurance policy from INA through the Cordner
Ageney. He was advised of the change of ownership of
that business from Cordner to Bowen in 1962, and he
also continued to renew his professional liability insuranee policy with INA until August of 1966. (TR 123) At
that time he again attempted to renew the policy through
Bowen by eompleting a renewal request form mid mailing it with his check to Bowen's office. The policy expired at 12 :01 A.l\I., August 9, 1966 (Ex 7) and the
evidence tends to show and the trial court believed that
the renewal notice with the check for the premium was
mailed by Winger's wife on August 8, 1966, but was not
recei,·ed by Bowen until sometime during the evening
mail dcli\·ery of August 10, 1966. (TR 125, 151-152) At
approximately 7 :00 o'clock P.M. on August 9, 1966,
Winger injured a patient whilc working on her teeth
in his office. ('rH 43)

3

Ou August 10, 19G6, upon receipt of the renewal
request from \Vinger, Bowen sent a memo to Rulon
Myers, a licensed agent for INA asking him to renew the
Winger policy and to hill him (Ex. 26) and on August
12, 1966, Mr. Myers sent a memo (Ex. 39) to the INA
office in Salt Lake City, directed to Mr. l\Ierlin Perkins ,
asking that the Winger policy be renewed, stating that
the policy was formerly with the Boweu Agency. l\Ir.
Perkins returned the memo to Mr. ~Iyers with the following notation written on it:
Rulon - We are unable to renew or write this
for you - unless we have the supporting business
and a letter of record on your behalf.
Perk.
Sometime between August 13 and a couple of days
before the 19th of August, Winger reported the accident
to Bowen, and he in turn reported it directly to the Salt
Lake office of INA and dealt directly with that office
and its representatives in relation to the claim (TR 133135)
In December of 1965, Mr. Bill Webber, manager of
the Salt Lake office of IN A and Mr. Merlin Perkins,
who was then in the production department of the company, came to Bowen's office in Orem, and as a result
thereof Bowen's agency with the company was terminated. At that time .l\Ir. Perkins advised Bowen how
sorry he was about what had occurred and he then
advised Bowen that he, Bowen, could not acquire any
new business for the company, hut he could keep the
existing business he had and that renewals of policies
4

should be handled through 1\Ir. Rulon "Myers in Provo.
( 'l'R 171). On crnss examination of Bowen he admitted
that he knew he did not have authority to hind coverage
after the tcrminafom of his agency. There is no evidence
tliat Bowe11 eyer houll(l or attempted to bind coverage
after the termination of his agency, and he emphatically
denied having either bound or attempted to bind coverage
in the Winger matter. (TR 167-169)
Upon the termination of the agency relationship between INA and Bowen no notice was ever given to anyone by either Bowen or INA of such termination (TR
290)

Pursuant to the conversation with l\Ierlin Perkins,
Bowen did have several business transactions with INA
through Rulon 1\Iyers wherein existing policies were renewed or were to Le renewed.

In December, 1965 an existing policy on Orem City
was renewed by Bowen through Rulon 1\Iyers with the
knowledge of the company. (TR 171-173, Ex. 28-29). In
August of 1966 two transactions occurred relating to the
renewal of policies. Bowen sought renewal of two existing policies with INA on one A. V. Washburn. The
company knew these came from Bowen and that they
were renewals of existing policies. In the "\Vashburn
matter the policies were not renewed because l\Ir. "\Vashhnrn did not desire it because the premium was too
high; however, the company was willing to renew. (TR
173-176) The other transaction in August, 1966 related
to the 'Vinger policy. Again, the company knew this was

a reuewal of an existing policy and that it came from
Bowen's agency. ( I<}x. 39)
The other transaction relating to the renewal of an
existing policy occurred in November or December of
1966, wherein Bowen <lid not deal through Rulon Myers
but dealt directly with the Salt Lake office of INA.
(Ex. 32) That transaction uffolved the renewal of a
policy of one LeRoy Thorne, which policy was renewed
by th~~ company. (TR 177-181, Ex. 32-35)
From all the evidence before it, including the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits, the Court found
that the Winger policy "\\'as renewed 011 August 9, 1966
and that by reason of the conduct of both Bowen and
INA on Bowen's renewals of policies and INA's acceptance of said renewals and retaining the henefits
therefrom without objecting to Bowen's efforts in its
behalf, that Bowen was an agent of INA in relation to
the renewal of the ·winger policy. The Trial Court also
found that in each case of the renewal of an insurance
policy by insureds of INA through Bowen, the company
knew that the business was renewal business, that it
was coming from Bowen. The company knew the insured
had no knowledge of the termination of the agency relationship between the company and Bowen; in each case
the company renewed the policy or would have renewed
and obtained and retained the premiums on the renewals.
(R 71)
INA filed objections to the courts Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law which objections were overrulecl
and the company's Motion for a New Trial was denied.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN
LffWER COURT ARE PRESUMED BY THE
RI~VIE\VING COURT ON APPEAL TO BE
CORRECTED.
The cases are legion supporting the general proposition of law stated in Point I, and especially as it applies
to the instant ca12e. No cases have been found by respondent stating a contrary position.
Not only is tht-re a presumption of validity on appeal
of the judgment and proceeding in the lower court, but
the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to de>monstrate error, and in the absence of such the judgment
must he affirmed hy the reviewing court. Leithead vs.
Adair, 10 U. 2d 282, 351 P. 2d 956; Coombs vs. Perry,
2 U. 2d 381, 275 P. 2d. Again, on appeal the judgment of
the trial court is presumpth-ely correct and every reasonable intendment must be indulged in by the appellate
court in favor of it. Burton vs. Zions Co-operati1:e Mercantile Institution .. 122 U. 360, 249 P. 2d 514; Nagle vs.
Club Fontain.blue, 17 U. 2d 125, 405 P. 2cl 346; Petty vs.
Cindy Jfa,tmufacturing Corporation, 17 U. 2d 32, 404 P. 2d
30.
This proposition of law is correct and is binding
upon the appellate court whether the proceedings in the
lower court are before a judge only or a judge and jury.
Other cases supporting this proposition are Charlton
vs. Hackett, 11 U. 2d 389, 360 P. 2d 176; Universal Invest-
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ment Com.painy vs. Carpets, Inc. 16 U. 2d 336, 400 P. 2d
564; Taylor vs. Johnson, 15 U. 2d 342, 398 P. 2d 382·
'
Wendelboe vs. Jacobson, 10 U. 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178;
Hadley vs. Wood, 9 U. 2d 366, 345 P. 2d 197; Daisy
Distributors, Inc., vs. Local Union 976 Joint Council 67
'
'
Western Conference of Teamsters, 8 U. 2d 124, 329 P. 2d
414.
'

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND
AGAINST THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF.

It is the position of third party defendant, L. A.
Bowen, that because of the conduct of Insurance Company of North America in (a) failing to notify anyone
of the termination of the agency relationship between
the company and i\Ir. Bowen, (b) advising Mr. Bowen
to continue to handle existing business he had with them
such as renewing policies for insureds through a licensed
agent of the company, ( c) having knowledge of each
transaction wherein a policy was renewed or attempted
to be renewed and that such business came from Mr.
Bowen, ( d) failing to protest to .:\Ir. Bowen his action
in obtaining the renewal of existing policies with the
company and failing to prohibit him from such action
by any means available to it, ( e) actually renewing and
issuing policies for delivery to Mr. Bowen and subsequent
delivery to the insured, (f) getting the benefits of such
transactions by receiving the premiums paid by the
insured to Mr. Bowen upon the renewal and issuance
8

of the policy, and (g) retaining the benefits of such
transactions by keeping the insurance premiums received
from the policies renewed through Mr. Bowen, and (h)
holding Mr. Bowen out as its agent to all those who
had become insureds of the company through Mr.
Bowen's agency while he was a licensed agent of the
company, that Bowen was an agent of INA at the time
of the loss in question.
It is the duty of an insurance company to notify
insured persons who have dealt with their agent as the
representative of the company of the termination of his
authority, and if it fails to do so, it is bound by his acts
if such a person continues to deal with him as a representative of the company, in ignorance of the termination
of the agency. Southern L. Ins. Co. vs. McCaen, 96 U. S.
84, 24 L. Ed. 653; W esteru Millers Jfot. Ins. Co. vs.
Williams, (CA 5 Tex.) 231 F. 2d 425; Southern States
F. Ins. Co. vs. V mzn, 69 Fla. 549, 68 So. 647; Aetna Ins.
Co. vs. Stambaugh-Thomps01i Co., 76 Ohio St. 138, 81
N.1'~. 173; Strm1k vs. Firemans Ins. Co., 160 Pa. 345, 28
A. 779; Wilson vs. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 51 S.C.
540, 39 S.E. 245; Tuckers vs. America,n Aviation & Gen..
Tus. Co., 193 Tenn. 160, 278 S.W. 2d 677; 29 Am. Jur.,
Insurance, Sec. 144.

The purpose of this rule of law is, of course, for the
benefit of third persons who rely on the apparent agency
for the same purpose relating to insurance coverage,
often to their detriment. However, coupled with that
aspect of the rule is the fact that the company either
in one transaction or in a course of dealing holds the
9

individual out to the public, and possibly to the apparent
agent himself, as an agent of the company.
As far as insurance agents are concerrwd, their par.
ticular authorit~-, such as authority to enter into insnr.
ance contracts, receive premiums, bind coverage, waive
provisions o fthe p-0licy, eg., is considered in conjunction
with the particular matter to which that authority relates. An insurance company, the same as any other
principal, is liable for the acts done or contracts made
by one of its agents within the scope of the agent's
actual or apparent authority. Volker vs. Connecticut
Fire Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super., 314, 91 A. 2d 883; Sec1trify
[us. Co. vs. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 P. 151; Dem.ing
Invest. Co. vs. Shawaee F. Ins. Co., 16 Okla. 1, 83 P. 918
(rule recognized); Payne vs. New York L. Ins. Co., 173
·wash. 322, 23 P. 2d 6. An insurance company is also
liable for the acts of the agent that were unauthorized
when performed, if such acts arP subsequently ratified
b~- it. 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, SPc. 145.
Implied authority of an insurance ageut may arise
independently of any express grant of authority, as from
some manifestation of the insurer that the particular
authority in question shall exist in the agent, or it may
arise
as a necessarv
.
. or reasonable implication in order
to effectuate othPr authority expressly conferred. Viele
vs. Herma111..ea. Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super 314, 01 A. 2d 883;
Security Ins. Co. vs. Cameron, Supra; Deming ln1;csf111ent Co. vs. Shawnee F. Ins. Co., Supra; TV. B. Goode
d': Co. vs. Georgia Home T11s. Co., 92 Va. 392, 23 S.E. 744.
10

A custom or usage may also confer actual powers
upon an insurance agent which has not expressly been
given to him. Lo,ng vs. North British & Merca;ntile Ins.
Co., 137 Pa. 335, 20 A. 1014; Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. vs.
llooi:er, 113 Pa. 591, 8 A. 163; Nehring vs. Bast, 258
Minn. 193, 103 N.\V. 2d 368.
As the principles of law as discussed so far apply
to this case, it is the contention of third party defendant
that 1\lr. Bowen was given express authority after the
termination of his agency with the company to handle
ihe renewals of any existing policies he had placed with
ihe company prior to the termination of his agency. It
is also contended that the express authority was conferred upon l\Ir. Bowen to solicit renewals of existing
policies as a licensed agent of the company by reason
of the attitude and action of the company that such
authority existed by reason of the company (a) having
ad,~ised l\Ir. Bowen to conduct himself as he did, (b)
ha Ying knowledge of his conduct, ( c) failing to protest
:\fr. Bowen's actions or taking action to nullify them,
(d) issuing renewal policies for .'.\Ir. Bowen on business
that existed with his agency prior to the termination of
his agency, (e) obtaining benefits from Mr. Bowen's
actions in obtaining the renewals of the policies in the
form of insurance premiums paid for the policy renewals,
and (f) retaining the benefits by keeping the premiums
paid instead of returning the premiums and cancelling
the policies issued.
Again, it is contended by third party defendant that
he had actual authority to solicit the renewal of existing
11

policies with Insurance Company of North America because of the custom aud usage of the company in acquiescing in his action in obtainillg the renewals.
The conduct of the company i11 neqniescillg- and
ratifying Mr. Bowen's actions in soliciting renewals of
policies with the company after the termination of his
agency with it lends great weight and credence to Mr.
Bowen's testimony that he was ach·ised by Mr. Merlin
Perkins that he was authorized to continue to handle
renewals of existing business with the company of which
the policy of plaintiff was one. This is so even though
the letter of the company to Mr. Bowen, dated December
16, 1965, (Exhibit 124) purports to limit his authority.
It was after this particular letter was received that the
company acquiesced in and ratified ~Ir. Bowen's actio11s.
In relation to ratification of acts of au agellt, an
illsnrance company, like any other principal, may ratify
acts or contracts which were performed or made by its
agent, or hy a person who purported to act as its agent,
"·ithout authority to bind the company, so as to becomr
bound thereby. 29 Am. Jur. Insurance, Sec. 15:1.
Such ratification is equivalent to precedent or original authority, and unless the intervening rights of third
parties would thus be defratecl, relates back to supply
such original authority. Southern L. lus. Co. vs JtcCaen,
supra; Terry vs. Pro1:ide1it Fu11rl Snc., 13 Ind. App. 1,
41 N.E. 18; Kansas Farmers' F. [us. Co. vs. Sai11rlou.
52 Kan. 486, 35 P. 15; Rirerside Derelopmcnt Co. \'S.
Hartford F. Ins. Co., 105 Miss. 184, 62 So. 169 (recog-
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nizi11g general rule) ; 1ll cDonald vs. JU etro politan L. Ins.
('o., 68 N.H. 4, 38 A. 500; Eastman vs. Provident Mut.
Relief Asso., 65 N.H. 176, 18 A. 745; Excelsior F. Ins.
Co. vs. Rayed Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 343, 14 Am. Ref. 271.
If an unauthorized person solicits insurance, and the
insurer accepts the application, it thereby ratifies the
unauthorized act and places such person on the same
foundation and invests him with the same authority as
its commissioned agents insofar as the insured is concerned. See 29 Am .•J ur., Insurance, op. cit.

An insurer may ratify the receipt of an application
hy an unauthorized person purporting to act for it, by
issuing an insurance policy or certificate based upon the
application. See Eastman vs. Prorident Mut. Relief
Asso. 65 N.H. 176, 18 A. 745.
Ratification of such an act or contract may also be
effected by silence, failure to repudiate or acquiescence
in it, or by the receipt and retention of the benefits
issuing therefrom. In Southern L. Ins. Co. vs. McCearn,
96 U.S. 84, 24 L.Ed. 653, the silence of the company after
receiving from an agent, whose authority had been terminated, a statement that the premium on a policy had
heen paid by him was held to be equivalent to the adoption of the act of the agent. See Jlutual Ben. L. Ins. Co.
vs. Robertson, 59 Ill. 123, 14 Am. Rep. 8 ;Masonic Life
Asso vs. Robinson, 149 Ky. 80, 147 S.W. 882; Horwitz vs.
Equitable lllut. Ins. Co., 40 :!\Io. 557, 93 Am. Dec. 321;
Eastman vs. Provident Mut. Relief Asso., supra.; Gish
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vs. Insurance Comzwny of North America, 16 Okla. 59,
87 P. 769.

It is the overwhelming general rule of law that an
insurance eompany cannot ileeept the henefits of an
unauthorized transaction and reject its burden; however,
it is also true that in order for the ratification to be
binding on the insurer, the act or contract must be one
which could have been authorized in the first instance.
See Great Southern L. Ins. Co. vs. Dola11, (Tex. Comm.
App.) 262 S.vV. 475; 2 Am. Jur. 174, Agency, Sec. 217.
The insurance company must have knowledge of the
rrii1terial facts of the transaction or transactions before
the ratification can be binding upon it.

Jn 3 Am .•Tur. 2d, Agency Sec. 175 it is stated as
follows:
It is an estaiblished principal of the law of
agency that where a person acts for another who
accepts or retains the benefits or proceeds of his
efforts with knowledge of the mutual facts surrounding the transaction, such other must be
deemed to have ratified the methods employed,
as he may not, even though innocent, receive or
retain the benefits of, and at the same time disclaim responsibility for, the measures by which
they were acquired. This general principal applies, for example, to an unauthorized contract
affected, an unauthorized lom1 procured on behalf of the principal or purported principal. If
the agent procures a contract by fraudulent or
corrupt practices, although the principal has not
been privy in any way to such conduct of his
agent, yet by claiming thP lwnefits of the contract,

14

he must take it tainted as it may he with such
practiecs.
·
Thr·re arc annotations of this prineiple at 30 A.L.R. 2tl
~~4;

84 A.L.R. 2d 524; 49 A.L.R. 2d 1277; 48 A.L.R. 926.

Tn Kansas Farmer's Fire Ins. Co. vs. Saerdon,
( Knn.) :3;) P. 15 (1893), a person claiming to be a solicitor
or agent of the plaintiff in error, the fire insurance
company, on hm'ing in his possession blank applieations
of the company, rec0ived and forwarded to the company
an applieatioll endorsed hy him as the solicitor of the
rompany. The eompany accepted the application from
the unauthorized Bolicitor and paid him for his services
:rn solicitor and returned and delivered to him for the
insured the poliey applied for. Tt received the premium
011 the poliey through the solicitor less his charge for his
commission. The Kansas Supreme Court held that in an
action on the policy in question, the insurance company
li;wing- 0njoyed the benefits of the acts of the alleged
solicitor, could not deny that he was its agent for the
imrpoRe of soliciting and delivering the policy.

Third party defendant has been unable to find any
('Hsc with facts exactly as those involved in the instant

rasc. Howewr, from the authorities cited and the gennnl prineiplt>s of law for ·which they stand, it appears
11iat hasNl npon the facts of this case, the law as it applies
to similar transactions and generally to this area, and
equity and good conscience, the only conclusion that can
lie reached is tlrnt :Mr. Bowen had authority to solicit
nnd handle renewal business with defendant. The agency
trrmi11ated on December of 1965. After that time Mr.
15

Bowen handlc'd re1wwal lmsiness with Insnranre Com.
pany of North America :
( 1) The renewal of the Orem City policies which were i1 1
fact received through the agency of Rulon l\f yr>rs, but
with knowledge on the part of Insurance C:ompany of
North America that said business was heing initiated
and handled by ~Mr. Bowen. A policy was issued for
which the company rPcein'd a premium.

(2) The application for renewal of two policies on a
Mr. A. V. Washburn, in August, 1966. These were
handled through the Myers agency but with knowledge
on the part of the insurance company that Mr. Bowen
had initiated and was handling the business. In thi'
case the company was willing to renew th<:' two poliC'iri
but did not do so only because ~Ir. Bowen and 1Ir.
·washhurn decided against it.
(3) The appliration for renewal of tl10 professional liability policy of plaintiff in this action, Dr. Gaydon E.
Winger, on August, 1966. This was also handled through
the Myers ag0ncy hut with knowledge on the part of till'
company as to where the business came from. See Defondant 's FJx. :rn. It is iuteresting to note on that exhibit
that after being aware of the fart that this was renewal
business of Mr. Bowen, the compauy did not refuse to
renew the policy. The statem<:'nt made by the eompany
was that the policy could not be r<:'ne\\·ed "unless ( <:'mphasis mine) we have the supporting business and a letter of
record on your lwhalf. Perle"
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion it should again be pointed out that
Insurance Company of North America failed to notify
anyone of the termination of .Mr. Bowen's agency and in
doing so continued to hold him out as its agent to policy
holders that J\Ir. Bowen had acquired for the company.
For one year thereafter the company then knew that Mr.
Bowen was handling renewal business for it and made
no objection to these transactions. In no case was Mr.
Bowen advised to discontinue his activities with regard
to renewal business nor in any case was the insured
advised that Mr. Bowen's agency with the company had
tennillated. In two cases insurance policies were actually
renewed and the company received and retained the
premium which Mr. Bowen had collected. In no case did
the company cancel the renewed policy and return the
premium to the insured and advise it that Mr. Bowen
was no longer its agent. In one case with full knowledge
of the transaction the company would have renewed two
policies but ~fr. Bowen and the insured decided otherwise,
and in the \Vinger matter with full knowledge of the facts
the eompany would have renewed the Winger policy if it
could have also written the supporting coverage for him.

At the trial, Mr. Bowen claimed that representatives
of the company authorized him to handle renewal business with the company. Defendant denies this; however,
the company's actions involving Mr. Bowen and renewal
business lends great credence and weight to Mr. Bowen's
testimony in this regard.
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Defendant, Insurance Company of North America,
continuously held Mr. Bowen out as its agent after the
termination of his agency relationship with it. The com.
pany tlwrcafter, "·ith full knowledge of all material farts
in each insta11e0, ratiffr<l th0 acts of ~[r. Bow0n 011 the
renewal business. It is the position of third party
defendant that in each transaction invoked after the
termination of his agency with the company he had
authority to do what he did with regard to solicitation
of renewals of policy. Especially is this true in the
illstant case.
The judgment of the lower court should he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, .BJSQ.
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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